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Recent work by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) establishes an empirical modelling 
strategy which takes full account of the structural, non-(log-)linear impact of trade barriers on 
trade in new trade theory models. Structural new trade theory models have never been used to 
evaluate and quantify the role of endogenous preferential trade agreement (PTA) membership 
for trade in a way which is consistent with general equilibrium. Apart from this gap, the 
present paper aims at delivering an empirical model which takes into account both that 
preferential trade agreement membership is endogenous and that the world matrix of bilateral 
trade flows contains numerous zero entries. These features are treated in an encompassing 
way by means of (possibly two-part) Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation with 
endogenous binary indicator variables in the empirical model. 
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The unprecedented surge of preferential trade liberalization since World War II spurred
theoretical and empirical work on the matter alike. Theoretical research illustrated under
which conditions preferential trade agreements (PTAs) induce welfare gains for partici-
pants.1 Econometric work conﬁrmed that economic and political fundamentals determine
preferential trade liberalization through PTA membership very much along the lines hy-
pothesized by economic theory (see Baier and Bergstrand, 2002, 2004, 2009; Magee,
2003; Egger, Egger, and Greenaway, 2008): PTAs are most likely concluded among large,
similarly-sized, non-distant economies which have modern political systems. In part this
empirical work has even strived for an identiﬁcation of causal eﬀects of PTA membership
and found that, indeed, PTA membership causes bilateral trade.
However, from a theoretical perspective, there are two major discomforts with seem-
ingly all empirical work on the causal eﬀects of PTA membership on trade ﬂows. First,
general equilibrium eﬀects are ignored. All of the corresponding work relies on the so-
called stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) which requires that PTA member-
ship only aﬀects PTA insiders but outsiders not at all (see Wooldridge, 2002; Cameron and
Trivedi, 2005). Obviously, this is at odds with general equilibrium. Heckman, Lochner,
and Taber (1998) emphasize and illustrate that treatment eﬀects can be severely biased
when ignoring general equilibrium eﬀects. They criticize that the “paradigm in the econo-
metric literature on treatment eﬀects is that [...] there are no spillovers [...]” and argue
that “standard policy-evaluation practices are likely to be misleading [...]”, accordingly.
Second, the extensive margin of bilateral trade is forgotten about and sample selection is
induced by focusing on log-transformed trade ﬂows as outcome. This paper ventures for
an alternative approach which pays explicit attention to both of these problems.
We pursue an empirical modeling strategy which is informed by three inﬂuential
strands of recent empirical research in international economics: ﬁrst, the work on em-
1The existing body of theoretical work on endogenous trade policy in general and endogenous PTA
membership in speciﬁc is by far too large to be discussed here. However, we refer the interested reader
to the excellent surveys by Rodrik (1995), Baldwin and Venables (1995), and Baldwin (2008), for details.
1pirical estimation of general equilibrium models where trade costs exert bilateral as well
as multilateral eﬀects on trade and GDP (see Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Anderson and van
Wincoop, 2003; Anderson, 2009); second, research on zeros in bilateral trade matrices for
any year or averages of years suggesting that the extensive margin of bilateral trade should
be modeled explicitly in empirical analysis (see Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; 2008;
and Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2008); third, the literature on endogenous PTAs
and their causal eﬀects on trade ﬂows (see Baier and Bergstrand, 2002; 2007; 2009).2
Interestingly, these obviously important three bodies of work are virtually unconnected.
This paper treats PTA membership as an endogenous determinant of bilateral trade
while allowing for (numerous) zero bilateral trade ﬂows in the empirical model, and re-
specting both the bilateral and multilateral eﬀects of endogenous PTAs on trade in the
quantiﬁcation of PTA eﬀects. In contrast to preceding work by Eaton and Tamura (1994),
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2008), and Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008), we
allow (binary) determinants of exports to be endogenous. In particular, we suggest em-
pirical models based on pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation with endogenous (binary)
explanatory variables.
We apply these models to a cross-sectional data-set of bilateral trade ﬂows and their
determinants – among them a binary PTA membership indicator – for the year 2005. We
compute cum-PTA bilateral trade ﬂows and compare them to counterfactually predicted
trade ﬂows in a sine-PTA general equilibrium. Eliminating PTAs reduces trade ﬂows
among members directly, but it entails also indirect eﬀects on third countries through the
impact of PTAs on producer prices, consumer prices, and GDP.
Our ﬁndings may be summarized as follows. The results shed light on three poten-
tially large biases associated with the ignorance of the three mentioned issues: general
2The quantiﬁcation of the eﬀects of preferential trade agreement (PTA) membership has been a major
source of interest of empirical bilateral trade ﬂow modelers for decades. See Tinbergen (1962), Glejser
(1968), Aitken (1973), for some of the earliest examples and Freund (2000), Soloaga and Winters (2001),
and Carr` ere (2006) for more recent ones. Greenaway and Milner (2002) provide a useful survey. For
decades, the dominant paradigm in related work was that countries were randomly assigned to PTAs.
Only recently, Baier and Bergstrand (2002, 2004, 2007, 2009), Magee (2003), and Egger, Egger, and
Greenaway (2008) allowed for PTAs to be endogenous to trade in an econometric sense.
2equilibrium (third-country) eﬀects of PTA membership; zeros in trade matrices; and the
endogeneity of PTAs. The biases are of diﬀerent magnitude, though. Let us use the PTA-
related change of bilateral exports among members relative to nonmembers to quantify
biases. Then, for instance, a log-linear model of exports which ignores general equilib-
rium eﬀects on top of the other problems leads to a bias of -186 percentage points or -79%
relative to the preferable two-part approach (which inter alia controls for the presence
of heterogeneous ﬁrms). A one-part Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood model which
disregards non-random selection into positive exports and treats PTA membership as
exogenous leads to a bias of the impact of PTAs on members’ relative to nonmembers’
trade by -176 percentage points or -75% relative to a two-part model which copes with
all of the mentioned problems. A one-part model which acknowledges endogenous PTA
membership but disregards the problem of an excessive number of zeros in the data leads
to a downward bias of the PTA eﬀect by about -73 percentage points or -31%.
Apart from these biases there are another two which seem relatively less important.
Disregarding the presence of heterogeneous ﬁrms appears less relevant than the mentioned
biases. A two-part model without heterogeneous ﬁrm controls leads to a bias of the av-
erage estimated PTA eﬀect of -15 percentage points or -6% in general equilibrium. In
comparison, it is even less harmful to ignore that PTA membership eﬀects are hetero-
geneous due to the variation in most-favored nation tariﬀ rates. Ignoring heterogeneous
tariﬀs in the preferable two-part PTA model leads to a downward bias of the PTA-induced
eﬀect of less than one-tenth of a percentage point.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section brieﬂy introduces
the bilateral trade ﬂow model we will rely upon. Section 3 points out three problems with
the implementation of that model in applied work targeted towards the analysis of PTA
membership eﬀects on trade. Section 4 describes the speciﬁcation and data. Section
5 introduces the modeling strategy to overcome these obstacles by treating zero trade
ﬂows implicitly, and presents the corresponding estimation results. Section 6 derives a
zero-inﬂated gravity equation, lays out econometric two-part models, and summarizes the
estimation results thereof. Section 7 computes the impact of PTA membership as observed
3in the year 2005 and compares it to an unobserved counterfactual situation without any
PTA memberships in the same year. The last section concludes with a summary of the
most important ﬁndings.
2 Specifying bilateral trade ﬂows in the vein of An-
derson and van Wincoop (2003)
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) derive a general representation of bilateral aggregate
nominal trade ﬂows in new trade theory models with one sector and N countries. For
instance, such models include the ones of Anderson (1979) or Krugman (1980) with love-
of-variety preferences ` a la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Their framework can be brieﬂy
introduced as follows. Let us denote nominal exports of country i to country j (with
i,j = 1,...,N) by Xij and refer to trade costs associated with exports from country i to
j as tij. Finally, use yi, yj, and yW for country i’s, country j’s, and world GDP (total











where σ is the elasticity of substitution among products (variants) and Πi,Pj are so-called
multilateral resistance (MR) terms for exporters and importers, respectively. MR terms
reﬂect multilateral (non-linearly weighted) trade costs ﬁrms of an exporting country and
consumers in an importing country are faced with. Empirically, these MR-terms are not



























3Notice that the 2N equations have to be properly normalized to avoid multiple solutions to the system
of 2N equations (see Anderson, 2009).
4The structural representation of the model brings about a substantial advantage over
other, reduced-form (and partly ad-hoc) speciﬁcations of gravity models of bilateral trade.
Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998, p. 381) mention that “standard policy-evaluation
practices are likely to be misleading” if individual (in our case, country-pair speciﬁc)
choices aﬀect others’ economic outcome, as is the case in general equilibrium models like
the one we are considering. “The paradigm in the econometric literature on treatment
eﬀects is that [...] there are no spillovers [...] .” Since spillover eﬀects from one country-
pair to others are at the very heart of the matter, a full account of the impact of trade
costs or PTA membership on exports in general equilibrium needs to respect their eﬀect
on all variables on the right-hand side of (1): on trade costs as such (tij), on exporter GDP
(yi), importer GDP (yj), and world GDP (yW), respectively (since they are a function
of trade ﬂows), and on the exporter and importer MR terms (Πi and Pj), respectively.
Notice that the direct eﬀects of trade costs are generally dampened by the MR terms as
illustrated in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
Since direct measures of trade frictions tij are typically not available, one uses proxy
variables thereof. The bilateral distance between countries’ capitals (DISTij), a com-
mon international border indicator (BORDij), and a common oﬃcial language indicator
(LANGij) are typical examples. In most empirical models of bilateral trade ﬂows, trade
policy is accounted for as an element of tij by including an indicator variable of prefer-
ential trade agreement membership (PTAij). The commonly adopted assumption about
the relationship between tij and these proxy variables is
t
1−σ
ij = exp(β1 lnDISTij + β2BORDij + β3LANGij + ... + δPTAij). (3)
Substituting (3) into (1), we obtain the multiplicative model
Xij = exp(Z
′
ijβ + δPTAij + αi + γj), (4)
where Zij = (1,lnDISTij,BORDij,...) is a vector containing a constant and all trade cost
5or trade facilitating variables except PTAij. Moreover, β = (β0,β1,β2,...) is a vector of
coeﬃcients corresponding to the elements in Zij. αi = ln(yiΠ
σ−1
i ) and γj = ln(yjP
σ−1
j ).
In this model, the coeﬃcient on the constant is deﬁned as β0 = −lnyW.
3 Empirical problems with the implementation of a
structural gravity model
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) suggest estimating a stochastic version of (4)
Xij = exp(Z
′
ijβ + δPTAij + αi + γj)ǫij, (5)
by taking the logs of both the left-hand-side and the right-hand-side and essentially min-
imizing the sum of squared residuals subject to (2). Alternatively, the parameters β and
δ can be estimated directly by treating αi and γj as ﬁxed country eﬀects. Given these
parameters, the 2N multilateral resistance terms in (2) may be computed subsequently.
Since general equilibrium eﬀects are fully captured by the country ﬁxed eﬀects, estima-
tion of β and δ does not hinge upon the general equilibrium structure of the model. In
fact, it is well-known that the econometric speciﬁcation (5) can represent a wide range
of (one-sector) models including the multi-country version of the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman
model, Eaton and Kortum (2002), or Feenstra (2004). Hence, most of what we will talk
about with regard to estimation below applies to a wide range of empirical models that are
informed by general equilibrium theory. The choice of the underlying theoretical model
determines the magnitude and transmission channels of comparative static eﬀects but not
parameter estimates.
With parameter estimation, two issues may arise in such an empirical context. First
and most importantly, recent work in international trade emphasizes that PTA member-
ship should be treated as an endogenous rather than an exogenous determinant of trade
(see Baier and Bergstrand, 2002, 2007, 2009; Magee, 2003). Baier and Bergstrand (2004)
derived theoretical hypotheses about the determinants of PTA membership which work
6well in empirical applications. Yet, while previous work put great eﬀort into identifying
the causal eﬀects of (endogenous) PTA membership, the empirical paradigm has been
using microeconometric methods for program evaluation which prevent structural esti-
mation of the impact of PTA membership as suggested by equations (1) and (2).4 This
research thus assumed that PTA membership of one country-pair only aﬀects this pair’s
bilateral exports but not those of other country-pairs. The latter feature is at odds with
both intuition and general equilibrium. We will show how model (1) can be adapted to
account for some endogenous trade frictions, still obeying (2). Obviously, such a goal can
only be achieved by means of instrumental variable estimation.
Second, depending on the data-set in use, the N(N − 1)-size vector X of bilateral
exports with typical element Xij may contain numerous zeros (see Helpman, Melitz and
Rubinstein, 2008) whose omission (by taking the log of the left-hand-side of the model)
would in general lead to an eﬃciency loss and to inconsistent parameter estimates. Some
authors have circumvented the problem of omitting zero trade ﬂows by adding a small
positive constant to X, a transformation that enables logarithmizing all Xij. Santos Silva
and Tenreyro (2006) show that this approach leads to inconsistent parameter estimates
as well. The severity of the bias resulting from this ad-hoc solution can be quite large.
Thus, estimating the model in its original multiplicative form (5) seems highly prefer-
able. Furthermore, multiplicative models as in (5) imply by construction that higher
conditional expectations go hand in hand with higher conditional variances. This pattern
of heteroskedasticity is a well-known stylized fact of trade data, rendering multiplicative
estimation of the model even more attractive.
We elaborate on these issues in Section 5, where we present an econometric model
of the gravity equation which is able to appropriately deal with both of these problems.
Before that, we describe our general speciﬁcation and the data used.
4Previous work predominantly relied on Heckman-type switching regression models (Baier and
Bergstrand, 2002; Magee, 2003) or matching methods based on the propensity score (Baier and
Bergstrand, 2002, 2009).
74 Speciﬁcation and data
We broadly follow Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and Egger, Egger, and Greenaway (2008)
to model selection into PTA membership as a function of three sets of characteristics:
variables capturing political aﬃnities or impediments to bilateral trade liberalization,
proxies for iceberg trade costs, and country size and relative factor endowments. We
classify two countries as belonging to a common PTA, if they were active since 2005
or earlier as notiﬁed to the World Trade Organization. The data were augmented and
corrected by using information from PTA secretariat web-pages and they were compiled
to obtain a binary dummy variable reﬂecting PTA memberships for the year 2005. The
three sets of exogenous variables contain the following elements:
Variables capturing political aﬃnities or impediments to bilateral trade liberalization: Po-
litical scientists have pointed to a number of political factors which are hypothesized to
aﬀect bilateral trade ﬂows (see Egger, Egger, and Greenaway, 2008, for a brief survey).
The corresponding variables reﬂect characteristics of political systems. The associated
variables are based on the data collected in the Polity IV Project (see Marshall and
Jaggers, 2007). In particular, we include the absolute diﬀerence in a score variable,
measuring the autocracy of an exporter and an importer, respectively (AUTOCij);5
the absolute diﬀerence in a variable, measuring the durability of an exporter’s and an
importer’s political regime, respectively (DURABij);6 the absolute diﬀerence in a score
variable, measuring the political competition in the government of an exporter and an
importer, respectively (POLCOMPij).7
Proxies for iceberg trade costs: Log bilateral (great circle) distance between two countries’
5AUTOCij measures Institutionalized Autocracy in a country. In the most extreme form, autocracy
suppresses competitive political participation, chief executives are chosen within a small political elite,
and once in oﬃce exercise power almost without institutional constraints. The source data vary between
0 and 98.
6DURABij measures the number of years since the most recent regime change or the end of a transition
period without any stable political institutions in place. DURABij is computed for all years beginning
with the ﬁrst regime change since 1800 or the date of independence if that event occurred after 1800.
7POLCOMPij measures to which degree party participation is regulated in a country and to which
degree there is competition in participation. The source data vary between 0 and 98.
8capitals (DISTij);8 an indicator variable which is one in case of a common land border
between countries i and j and zero else (BORDij); an indicator variable which is set
to one if two countries have a common language and zero else (LANGij); an indicator
variable which is set to one if two countries are located at the same continent and
zero else (CONTij); an indicator variable which is set to one if one of two countries
had been a colony of the other in the past and zero else (COLONYij); an indicator
variable which is set to one if one of two countries had been a colony of the other after
the year 1945 and zero else (CURCOLij); an indicator variable which is set to one if
the two countries had a common colonizer in the past and zero else (COMCOLij); an
indicator variable which is set to one if one country was part of the other in the past and
zero else (SMCTRYij). All of the mentioned trade cost indicators are taken from the
geographical database provided by the Centre d’´ Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations
Internationales (CEPII). The list of variables in Baier and Bergstrand (2004) did not
include (country dummies and) LANGij, COLONYij, CURCOLij, COMCOLij, or
SMCTRYij.
Country size and relative factor endowments: Exporter and importer country size in terms
of their log GDP as two separate determinants as well as all other country-speciﬁc de-
terminants such as population, capital-labor ratio, etc., are fully accounted for by ﬁxed
exporter and importer dummy variables.
Baier and Bergstrand (2004) use non-linear transformations of exporter and importer
log GDP and include log total bilateral GDP and log similarity of bilateral GDP as
determinants of PTA. In addition, they include two measures of relative factor en-
dowment diﬀerences. One of them reﬂects the capital-labor relative factor endowment
diﬀerence between two countries in a pair and the other one captures the capital-labor
relative factor endowment diﬀerence between that pair and the rest of the world. We
recreated these four variables, although for reasons of data availability (the data-set
used here contains 15,750 country-pairs while the one in Baier and Bergstrand, 2004,
8Baier and Bergstrand (2004) include a variable which is deﬁned as NATURALij = −DISTij. Hence
the expected sign of DISTij is exactly the opposite of the one of NATURALij.
9covered only 1,453 country-pairs) we had to use real GDP per capita instead of em-
ploying capital-labor ratios.9 However, capital-labor ratios are highly correlated with
real GDP per capita. While these variables worked well for the determination of PTA
membership, we ran into convergence problems when using these jointly for the PTA
and exports equations. We conducted robustness checks using two of them at a time
(not reported) to make sure that our reported results where not changed by their inclu-
sion or omission. In the speciﬁcation used in the following sections, we omitted these
variables, as the detected patterns for parameter estimates were not aﬀected by their
inclusion or omission in any substantial way.
Finally, our empirical model includes the following trade cost variables in Zij in
the nominal exports outcome equation (5): DISTij, BORDij, and LANGij, CONTij,
DURABij, AUTOCij, POLCOMPij, CURCOLij. Otherwise, nominal exports are a func-
tion of a complete set of exporter and importer dummy variables,10 and of (potentially
endogenous) PTAij. Data on bilateral exports in nominal U.S. dollars are collected from
the United Nation’s World Trade Database.
−− Table 1 −−
Table 1 summarizes mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the dis-
tribution of the dependent and independent variables employed in the estimated models.
Here, we would like to emphasize that about 37 percent of the cells of the bilateral ex-
ports matrix are zero and about 22 percent of the 15,750 country-pairs in our data-set
are members of a common PTA.
9Data on real GDP and population are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
10Which capture GDP and MR terms in (5).
105 Estimating a gravity model with zero export ﬂows
and endogenous PTA membership
For an assessment of the eﬀects of PTA membership on trade ﬂows, it is necessary to
obtain consistent estimates of the unknown parameter vector β and the PTA parameter
of interest, δ. However, δ does only reﬂect direct eﬀects of PTA membership on exports.
To quantify total eﬀects – which also account for feedback across countries consistent with
general equilibrium – we need to compute counterfactual exports without PTA member-
ship. The latter also account for the impact of PTA membership on GDPs and MR
terms as explained in Section 2. We will quantify the impact of PTA memberships by
comparing predicted exports of PTA insiders with PTAs as of 2005 relative to outsiders
with predicted relative trade ﬂows in a counterfactual scenario without any PTAs. While
the corresponding simulation results are presented in Section 7, our ﬁrst objective in the
subsequent sections is to consistently estimate β and δ.
5.1 Econometric model
Since the parameters of interest in model (5) are β and δ, terms αi and γj can be con-
sidered, from an econometric point of view, as nuisance parameters. The model to be
estimated thus represents a two-way country-speciﬁc eﬀects model, where αi and γj sub-
sume the eﬀects of GDP and MR terms, but may depend on other country-speciﬁc factors
as well. The appropriate econometric methods depend on the assumptions on the relation-
ship between (αi,γj) and the regressors, Zij and PTAij. If (αi,γj) were independent of
Zij and PTAij, random eﬀects estimation would be consistent and eﬃcient. However, the
underlying economic model suggests that αi and γj depend on Zij and PTAij. Therefore,
the model should be treated as a two-way ﬁxed eﬀects model.
There are two important diﬀerences to a standard panel data model, though. First,
this model is non-linear, and simple (within) transformations to eliminate the ﬁxed eﬀects
are not available. Second, since the data consist of all possible pairs of N countries, and
11each country is observed as both exporter and importer, there are N(N −1) observations.
Hence, adding one country to an existing set of N economies gives 2N additional obser-
vations but only 2 additional parameters. It follows that there is no incidental parameter
problem, and the country ﬁxed eﬀects can be estimated consistently (for N → ∞) by
including a dummy variable for each importer and exporter country.11 This procedure is
computationally intensive, given the large number of 2N −2 ﬁxed eﬀects to be estimated,
but it is straightforward in its application.
The conditional expectation function (CEF) of model (5) is
E(Xij|Zij,PTAij,αi,γj) = exp(Z
′
ijβ + δPTAij + αi + γj)E(ǫij|Zij,PTAij,αi,γj). (6)
Under the assumption of exogenous PTA membership, E(ǫij|Zij,PTAij,αi,γj) = 1 and
model (5) would be simply an exponential CEF model. However, acknowledging that PTA
membership is potentially endogenous, we want to allow for possible correlation between
the error term ǫij and the propensity to form an agreement. To tackle this problem we
implement an instrumental variable method based on the joint distribution of ǫij and





1 if W ′
ijθ ≥ vij,
0 if W ′
ijθ < vij,
(7)
where Wij is a vector comprised of variables aﬀecting a country i’s participation decision in
a preferential trade agreement with country j. The elements of Wij have been listed in Sec-
tion 4 and they contain all elements of Zij as well as instrumental variables excluded from
(6). Endogeneity arises if the errors vij and ǫij are not statistically independent. Follow-
ing Terza (1998), it is possible to derive a tractable form of E(Xij|Zij,PTAij,Wij,αi,γj)
under the assumption of bivariate normality of vij and ln(ǫij), which leads to the following
11The classical incidental parameter problem in non-linear panel models says the following. Suppose
that data vary in two dimensions, one of which is small (with a ﬁxed number of T units) and one is
large (with N → ∞ units). Then, it is impossible to estimate individual ﬁxed eﬀects for each unit in N
consistently. Similarly, the slope parameters of covariates can then not be estimated consistently.
12expressions




ijβ + δPTAij + αi + γj) and (9)
Ψij ≡ E(ǫij|Zij,PTAij,Wij,αi,γj)
= PTAij




+ (1 − PTAij)
1 − Φ(ϑ + W ′
ijθ)
1 − Φ(W ′
ijθ)
.
The last equality follows from joint normality of the errors, where Φ( ) denotes the cu-
mulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.12 The parameter ϑ is
equal to the square root of the variance of ln(ǫij), multiplied by ρ, the correlation coeﬃ-
cient between vij and ln(ǫij). If ρ = 0, the errors are independent, and Ψij = 1 so that
the conditional expectation of Xij in (8) simpliﬁes to λij, which is exactly the special case
considered in (6) with E(ǫij|Zij,PTAij,αi,γj) = 1. However, if ρ  = 0, estimation of the
parameters β contained in λij will be inconsistent if Ψij is neglected.13
The recent literature has suggested non-linear least squares (NLS) as well as various
pseudo-maximum likelihood (PML) estimators as the preferred approaches to estimate
multiplicative gravity models such as (6) with E(ǫij|Zij,PTAij,αi,γj) = 1 (Santos Silva
and Tenreyro, 2006).14 These estimators diﬀer in their weighting functions, and thus in
eﬃciency. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2008) show that if the conditional variance of
the exports is proportional to the conditional mean, then the ﬁrst-order conditions from
12Note that the assumption of normality leads to a Probit model for PTAij as is common in the
empirical literature. As for ln(ǫij), which is an additive element to the linear index Z′
ijβ+δPTAij+αi+γj,
it can be thought of as unobserved heterogeneity stemming from omitted variables. Assuming normality
here does not seem wholly unreasonable, since a case can be made for normality even if some omitted
variables are not normally distributed, as their sum would tend to be so by some version of the central
limit theorem if only the omitted variables were suﬃciently numerous and independent.
13An alternative estimation technique which does not rely on bivariate normality is the GMM approach
of Windmeijer and Santos Silva (1997). However, no comparable extension of this GMM approach for
the two-part model has been proposed. Our parametric assumptions allow us to extend the estimator to
the two-part model of Section 6.2.
14Under PML the information matrix equality does not hold and robust standard errors are computed
using the “sandwich” estimator involving the inverse of the Hessian matrix and the outer product of the
gradient.
13minimizing the squared errors of the model are numerically equivalent to the ﬁrst-order
conditions of the Poisson PML model. Also, they ﬁnd that the Poisson PML estimator
performs well compared to other PML and NLS estimators in a series of diﬀerent Monte
Carlo simulation setups.15
Likewise, the parameters of model (8) can be estimated by non-linear least squares,
by minimizing the sum of squares of (Xij −λijΨij) as in Terza (1998), or by Poisson PML
estimation where the conditional expectation is now λijΨij. As before, the NLS estimator
gives more weight to observations with larger trade ﬂows, while the Poisson PML estimator
gives equal weight to all observations. While both techniques yield consistent estimates
of the parameters if the conditional mean (8) is correctly speciﬁed, the results reported
in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) strongly encourage us towards viewing Poisson PML
estimates as more eﬃcient. The Poisson PML estimator for the model with endogenous
PTA is implemented as a two-step estimator. In a ﬁrst step, consistent estimates of θ are
obtained from a Probit regression of model (7). In a second step, we replace θ by ˆ θ in (8)
and use Poisson PML to estimate the remaining parameters over β,δ and ϑ. Second-step
standard errors have been adjusted to account for the variance of ﬁrst-step estimates.
5.2 Estimation results
Using the data described in Section 4, we estimated the parameters of the structural mod-
els of Section 5.1 by Poisson PML. Table 2 displays estimates of three alternative models
of nominal bilateral exports in U.S. dollars (Xij). Column (2) summarizes estimates from
a na¨ ıve log-linear model which simply drops all data points for which bilateral exports are
zero and treats PTA membership as exogenous. Obviously, the corresponding estimates
in column (2) diﬀer quite starkly from the ones in columns (3) and (5) and so do their
comparative static eﬀects so that we will dismiss this estimator and not refer to it further
15Alternative consistent estimators include other members of the linearized exponential family such
as the normal PML model or the gamma PML model. The negative binomial model is not a linear
exponential family unless the dispersion parameter is set to an arbitrary constant. We do not report
such other estimates since, with our data and speciﬁcations, their numerical properties were poor and
convergence was hard to achieve, the likely reason being the presence of numerous ﬁxed eﬀects to which
the Poisson PML estimator appears to be less sensitive to.
14in the subsequent discussion. Column (3) reports parameters and robust standard errors
of a Poisson PML model that treats PTAij as exogenous. In column (5), PTAij is allowed
to be endogenous. For this, we used a ﬁrst-stage probit model based on the covariates
mentioned in Section 4 and summarized in column (4) of Table 2. In principle, the model
for endogenous PTAs does not need instruments to be identiﬁed if the distributional as-
sumptions are met. As we did not wish to rely on functional form alone, we excluded a
subset of the ﬁrst-stage variables Wij from the set of second stage variables Zij to act as
instruments.
The instruments should have an eﬀect on the probability to form a PTA, but they
should not have other, direct eﬀects on exports. The ﬁrst assumption can be tested by
performing an F-test on the joint relevance of the instruments in the reduced-form equa-
tion in column (4). We test the second assumption in two ways. On the one hand, we
include them as additional regressors in the outcome equation and test for their relevance
on outcome beyond their role for PTA. We do so by performing F-tests on the joint
relevance of the instruments in the model in column (5). Moreover, we test whether the
instruments pass a conventional test for overidentifying restrictions in a log-linearized ver-
sion of the model for positive exports. The variables COLONY, COMCOL and SMCTRY
are signiﬁcant determinants of PTA as can be seen from the low p-value of the reported
F statistic in column (4), and they pass the tests for instrument validity according to the
insigniﬁcant F-tests on overidentifying restrictions in column (5). Hence, countries are
more likely to select into PTA membership given a shared colonial past, but – after con-
trolling for other determinants of trade ﬂows – these determinants do not directly aﬀect
trade.16
−− Table 2 −−
The results in Table 2 suggest the following conclusions. First of all, selection into
PTAs based on observables is positive for some variables such as CONT and CURCOL:
16In contrast to this, more recent colonial ties (CURCOL, which measures colonizing after 1945) do
have a signiﬁcant impact on trade beyond inﬂuencing PTA membership.
15these factors raise the probability of joining a PTA and also tend to have a trade-increasing
eﬀect, implying that particularly those country-pairs which display a high level of goods
trade ﬂows select into PTAs anyway. Notice that this result is consistent with the hypoth-
esis in Baier and Bergstrand (2004) according to which PTAs exhibit the highest welfare
gains in countries where bilateral trade ﬂows would be (and are) large. However, there
are also variables which negatively aﬀect both selection into PTAs as well as bilateral
exports: examples are DIST and DURAB. Finally, there are observables which have the
opposite impact on selection into PTAs and on exports: for instance, BORD, LANG, and
POLCOMP, aﬀect selection into PTAs negatively but exports positively; on the contrary,
AUTOC aﬀects selection into PTAs positively but exports negatively.
Second, there is evidence for selection into PTAs on unobservables. Endogeneity of
PTAij can be assessed by a simple t-test on ˆ ϑ, an estimate of the (scaled) correlation
between PTAij and the stochastic error in the exports. If PTAij is exogenous, the corre-
lation must be zero, so that the null hypothesis ϑ = 0 provides a valid test for exogeneity.
We ﬁnd that ˆ ϑ is negative and signiﬁcant, thus rejecting exogeneity of PTAij. A negative
ϑ indicates that unobservables (i.e., bilateral factors other than the economic and politic
determinants which we include in our models) favoring the creation of a PTA on average
come along with unobservables that have a negative impact on bilateral trade. This nega-
tive self-selection based on unobservables leads to a downward bias in the estimated PTA
parameter: the point estimate increases as we abandon the assumption of exogeneity. The
remaining parameters are fairly stable across columns (3) and (5).
The results from the probit estimation for the reduced-form equation of PTA are
broadly in line with comparable previous work. The political variables DURAB, POL-
COMP and AUTOC turn out to be important for the decision to join a PTA as in Egger,
Egger, and Greenaway (2008).17 These variables were not included in the models of Magee
(2003) or Baier and Bergstrand (2004), nor were the colonial history variables. However,
17They are also important determinants of trade ﬂows. In general, discrepancies on the levels of political
competition, autocracy and durability reduce the probability of forming a PTA and the volume of trade.
However, this fails for the diﬀerence in autocracy, which has a positive eﬀect on PTA, and the diﬀerence
in political competition which appears to increase exports.
16the ﬁnding of statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of a positive inﬂuence if countries are on the
same continent (CONT) is consistent with Baier and Bergstrand (2004), and the nega-
tive eﬀect of distance is in line with both Baier and Bergstrand’s (2004) cross-sectional
analysis and Magee’s (2003) cross-section and panel results.
6 Modeling zero trade ﬂows explicitly
In our data set, about 37.2 percent of all entries in the bilateral trade matrix were zeroes.
The previous approach accommodated those zero trade ﬂows implicitly. We did not need
to exclude non-trading country-pairs, nor did we artiﬁcially change the source data (e.g.,
by adding a positive constant to all export ﬂows as in Felbermayr and Kohler, 2006)
to allow for log-linearization. Yet the high incidence of zero trade makes it potentially
interesting to split the overall eﬀect of PTA membership on expected trade volumes into
its two component parts, an eﬀect at the extensive country margin of exports – i.e., the
number of pairings which started exporting because of PTA membership – and the eﬀect
at the the intensive country margin – the extent to which PTA membership raised exports
among pairs that traded already.
The focus on country margins is diﬀerent from the recent emphasis on ﬁrm margins
introduced by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008). In their model, trade volumes
(our intensive country margin) can change due to new (and less productive) ﬁrms entering
into export markets, or due to existing ﬁrms expanding their activities. For our analysis,
this distinction is unimportant, as both eﬀects are part of the causal pathway from PTA
membership to increased country trade volumes, and we are interested in this overall
eﬀect.
To motivate our econometric speciﬁcation of a two-part gravity model, we therefore
consider a model of symmetric monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, as in Krugman (1980),
thereby neglecting ﬁrm heterogeneity. In that model the extent of ﬁxed bilateral market
entry costs relative to operating proﬁts in a market governs a ﬁrm’s decision to serve the
target market via exports or not.
176.1 Theoretical model
Let us denote export-market speciﬁc ﬁxed costs for ﬁrm b in country i to deliver goods
to market j by fj(b). Each ﬁrm b supplies a single variety of the product and faces
market-speciﬁc proﬁts πj(b) in country j = 1,...,N of
πj(b) = [ˆ pj(b) − ˆ zj(b)]cj(b) − fj(b). (10)
In equation (10), ˆ pj(b) denotes the consumer price of variant b and ˆ zj(b) are the associated
marginal costs of supplying variant b to consumers in j (including marginal production
costs and trade costs). Unlike Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), let us assume
for the model outset that all producers in country i are symmetric with respect to ˆ zj(b)
and fj(b).18 As a consequence, we may drop product index b throughout our analysis
and index products by their country of origin. Then, we may substitute πj(b) = πij,
ˆ pj(b) = ˆ pij, ˆ zj(b) = ˆ zij, cj(b) = cij, and fj(b) = fij for all variants delivered by i-borne
producers to consumers in j.
Firms in i will now maximize proﬁts across all markets by setting identical mill prices
pi for consumers everywhere. With iceberg-type trade costs tij for exports from i to j,
the relationship between consumer prices and mill prices is determined as ˆ pij = pitij.
Similarly, marginal delivery costs relate to marginal production costs by ˆ zij = zitij, and







Accordingly, we may rewrite equation (10) as
πij = (pi − zi)xij − fij. (11)
Notice that ﬁxed entry costs fij are speciﬁc to an import market. Consequently, i-borne
ﬁrms will decide to supply goods to consumers in j only if operating proﬁts (pi−zi)xij cover
the market-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs fij. With monopolistic competition, a constant elasticity
18We will estimate some models below that accommodate the case of heterogeneous ﬁrms. This can be
done by introducing a polynomial control function which is based on the linear predictions in the extensive
margin model, similar to Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008). See below for further details.
18of substitution σ between products, and a ﬁxed markup over marginal production costs,
operating proﬁts per unit of output are (pi − zi) = pi/σ and i-borne ﬁrms will supply
market j only if pixij ≥ σfij. Let us deﬁne an indicator function Iij which is unity, if
pixij ≥ σfij, and zero else. After deﬁning the number of producers in country i as ni, we
may write aggregate nominal goods exports from i to j in equilibrium as







As in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), a country’s world (including intranational)














Now, after deﬁning yW =
 N
i=1 yi, we may substitute (nip
1−σ
i ) by yi/yWΠ
1−σ
i in (12)
to obtain an equivalent expression for nominal aggregate bilateral exports to the one in
equation (1). Yet, unlike in (1), zero bilateral exports may surface in the non-stochastic
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j are the equivalent expressions to the ones in equation (2), but
allowing for zero trade ﬂows.
196.2 An empirical two-part model of trade
We consider now estimation of a stochastic version of the gravity model with zero trade
ﬂows as in (14):
Xij = Iij exp(Z
′
ijβ + δPTAij + αi + γj)ǫij. (16)
Taking expectations and using the law of iterated expectations we can write the CEF as
E(Xij| ) = Pr(Iij = 1| )E(exp(Z
′
ijβ + δPTAij + αi + γj)ǫij| ,Iij = 1)
= Pr(Iij = 1| )E(Xij| ,Iij = 1). (17)
This is a two-part model which allows to decompose the eﬀects of the explanatory variables
on exports into an eﬀect on the extensive country margin – i.e., the decision to export to
a country at all – and on the intensive margin – i.e., on the value of exports conditional on
positive exports. In the baseline model (8), the estimated eﬀect represents some average
of these two. Two-part econometric models have been discussed in econometrics for some
time (Cragg, 1971; Duan, Manning, Morris, and Newhouse, 1983), but have not been
implemented in the empirical trade literature so far, to the best of our knowledge.
To complete the speciﬁcation of the two-part model and make it operational, functional
forms for the probability of trading and the expected trading volume have to be deﬁned.
Retaining endogeneity of PTA in exports, we postulate for the second part of (17) a
similar relationship as the one used before,
E(Xij|Zij,Wij,PTAij,Iij = 1) = λijΨij, (18)
where λij and Ψij are analogous to the expressions in (9). However, note that as this
functional form is now assumed to hold for positive exporters only, and not for all obser-
vations as in (8)-(9), the parameters β, δ and ϑ in (18) do not denote the same quantities
as in the model of Section 5.
Let us now turn to the ﬁrst part of the model, the probability of country i to serve
20country j via exports at all. For this purpose, the model for Iij as deﬁned by equation






ijω + κPTAij ≥ ξij,
0 else,
(19)
where the vector Qij is a set of observable variables determining positive exports (i.e.,
positive proﬁts for ﬁrms in i which are speciﬁc to market j), ω are the corresponding
unknown parameters, κ is the parameter of the PTA indicator variable, and ξij is a
stochastic term. Note that Qij may but need not contain the same elements as Zij. Since
PTA membership is an endogenous determinant of the positive value of exports, it would
be awkward to assume that it is exogenous to the decision to export at all from i to
j. Therefore, we explicitly allow for dependence between ξij and PTAij. With a binary
dependent variable (Iij) and a binary endogenous regressor (PTAij) at hand, we follow a
large literature in modeling the two binary processes by means of a bivariate probit model
(cf. Monfardini and Radice, 2008, for some recent applications). Then, the probability of
trading conditional on PTA membership can be written as (see, e.g., Greene, 2008)
Pr(Iij = 1|Qij,Wij,PTAij) = (20)
Φ2[(2PTAij − 1)W ′
ijθ,Q′
ijω + κPTAij,(2PTAij − 1)ρvξ]
Φ[(2PTAij − 1)W ′
ijθ]
,
where Φ2 denotes the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function and ρvξ the cor-
relation between v and ξ.
Thus, the impact of a variable on the CEF (17) is modeled in a very ﬂexible manner
in the two-part model, allowing a variable to have diﬀerent eﬀects in each part of the two
components of (17). For instance, it is possible for a variable to have a strong impact on
the extensive country margin – the probability of initiating exports to a given country
which is determined mainly by ω and κ at given Qij and PTAij – but to have a small
impact on the intensive margin – an increase of the value of positive bilateral exports
resulting principally from β at given regressors.
21A convenience of such a model is that the two parts, (18) and (20), can be estimated
separately. Thus, consistent estimates of the parameters of (20), ω,κ,θ as well as the
degree of endogeneity of PTA (as measured by the correlation between PTA and ξij) can
be obtained by standard maximum likelihood estimation. As for the parameters from
(18), we can use the same two-stage PML procedures described in Section 5, and include
only the observations with positive exports in the estimation.
6.3 A two-part model with correlated errors and ﬁrm
heterogeneity
The two-part model presented in the previous sub-section diﬀers from alternative ap-
proaches suggested in the recent literature to discriminate between eﬀects at the extensive
and intensive country margins of trade. The dominant procedure in the current literature
is to estimate some form of sample selection model (see Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein,
2008, and Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2008), most often a log-linear Heckit model.
While it is generally acknowledged that the statistical properties and robustness of
sample selection models are often inferior to the ones of the two-part model (Duan, Man-
ning, Morris, and Newhouse, 1984; Manning, Duan and Rogers, 1987; Leung and Yu,
1996; Dow and Norton, 2003), proponents of sample selection models have advocated the
use of the former over the latter based on its explicit modeling of the correlation structure
between the errors in the two equations.19 The two-part model does not estimate any
covariance terms between two error vectors. However, it is consistent under some general
classes of joint distributions which allow for stochastic dependence between error terms.
In particular, the two-part model allows for joint distributions of the errors which are
excluded by assumption under sample selection models (see Duan, Manning, Morris and
Newhouse, 1984). If the error terms are independent across the participation and out-
come equations, the two-part model is eﬃcient relative to the sample selection model. If
the errors are not independent, it is diﬃcult to decide between two-part versus selection
19The participation equation which, in our case, corresponds to the extensive country margin model of
trade, and the outcome equation which corresponds to the intensive country margin model.
22models as they are not nested.
We decided to address correlated disturbances between the intensive and extensive
margin by estimating an additional two-part model with a semiparametric control-function.
We follow Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) to postulate that the disturbances of
the two models are independent conditional on some nonlinear function of the predictions
of the extensive margin equation. In the Heckit approach taken by Helpman, Melitz,
and Rubinstein (2008), the linear prediction of the extensive margin model enters in a
nonlinear form by inclusion of the inverse Mills’ ratio, i.e., the ratio of the probability
density function and the cumulative normal distribution function evaluated at the linear
prediction of the participation equation. We denote this linear prediction by
  ηij ≡ Q
′
ij  ω + ˆ κPTAij
In our application, the inverse Mills’ ratio would not contribute signiﬁcantly to the ex-
planatory power since it is almost linear over a large part of the relevant range of its
argument.20
Thus, we model the correlation among disturbances conditional on a nonlinear func-
tion of ˆ ηij by including polynomial terms up to a fourth order (excluding the linear term
for reasons of collinearity). Not only is this approach more ﬂexible than the inclusion of
the Mills’ ratio alone, but it also has the added advantage that the polynomial control
function captures possible nonlinearities due to the ﬁrm extensive margin. Such additional
nonlinearities are present if ﬁrms are in fact heterogenous. Notice that either problem is
addressed by a (slightly diﬀerent) nonlinear function about   ηij also in Helpman, Melitz,
and Rubinstein (2008). We argue that the fourth-order polynomial in   ηij is a ﬂexible
approximation of both nonlinear functions. While within this semiparametric approach it
20This is true for the models we report below as well as ones that use religion as in Helpman, Melitz,
and Rubinstein (2008) as an identifying instrument in the participation equation for the extensive country
margin of exports. The coeﬃcient estimates are very robust to the inclusion of religion as an identifying
instrument for the extensive country margin of exports. However, we report results which exclude this
variable for the sake of keeping an additional 506 observations in the sample for which the religion variable
is not available.
23is impossible to distinguish between error correlation and ﬁrm heterogeneity, this is irrele-
vant for our purpose of analyzing country margins of trade.21 The (combined) presence of
error correlation and ﬁrm heterogeneity can be tested for by an F-test of joint signiﬁcance
on the coeﬃcients of the approximating polynomial function.
6.4 Estimation results
In this subsection, we discuss the parameter estimates from the models described in
Subsections 6.2 and 6.3. Similar to Table 2, Table 3 summarizes the estimates of two
alternative models of nominal bilateral exports in U.S. dollars (Xij). Again, every column
gives parameters and standard errors of covariates of interest in the pertinent equations.
Yet, now we distinguish between the process generating zero versus positive exports on
the one hand, and the process generating alternative positive values of exports on the
other. The former is captured by a probit model for Iij as explained in Section 6.2, while
the latter is estimated via Poisson PML.
Columns (2) to (4) give parameters and standard errors when treating PTAij as exoge-
nous. Both column (3) and (4) represent trade volume equations. The diﬀerence between
those two is that the model in column (4) controls for higher-order polynomial terms in
  ηij while the one in (3) does not. Hence, the speciﬁcation in (4) implicitly accommodates
correlation between the disturbances of the extensive country margin equation in column
(2) and the intensive country margin model in column (3) as well as heterogeneous ﬁrms
akin to the approach of Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008). In columns (6) to (8),
we treat PTAij as endogenous. To model this, in addition to the two equations for Iij
and exports, a third equation for PTA is needed. Endogeneity of PTAij in Iij is captured
by a recursive bivariate probit model as summarized in columns (5) and (6). While we
use the same speciﬁcation for the latent process behind the extensive country margin Iij
(i.e., the process ηij) as for positive exports (or E(Xij|Xij > 0)), the results are virtually
identical to a model where we use religion as an additional regressor in the extensive
21This is in contrast to work analyzing ﬁrm margins of trade, for which the distinction between ﬁrm
extensive margin and error correlation is crucial (Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein, 2008).
24margin model as in Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008). Similar to columns (3) and
(4) with exogenous PTAs, we estimate models (7) and (8) with endogenous PTAs where
the diﬀerence lies in the polynomial function about   ηij which is present in column (8)
but not in (7). The coeﬃcients of the polynomial function are jointly signiﬁcant (in both
the exogenous case in column (4) as well as in column (8) where PTA is endogenous)
suggesting some role for ﬁrm heterogeneity and/or error correlation between the decision
to trade and trade ﬂows.22
−− Table 3 −−
Consider the model imposing exogeneity ﬁrst. Every variable has two associated para-
meters, one corresponding to the extensive margin in column (2) and one for the intensive
margin of trade in column (3) or column (4). Almost all coeﬃcients have the same sign
in the extensive versus the intensive margin models. Exceptions are BORD, CURCOL,
and POLCOMP – the latter being insigniﬁcant in column (2) –, which appear to be im-
pediments to start trading but foster trade ﬂows once exports are positive. The result
about BORD and CURCOL is in line with previous research (see Helpman, Melitz and
Rubinstein, 2008).
To give an impression of the implied eﬀect on trade ﬂows, Table 4 shows the to-
tal partial eﬀect of PTA on trade. By partial eﬀect we mean here the eﬀect that PTA
has on exports keeping everything else constant, including the general equilibrium ef-
fects which work through the change in the multilateral resistance terms: E(X|PTA =
1,Z)/E(X|PTA = 0,Z) − 1. A quantiﬁcation by means of counterfactual analysis, tak-
ing into account third-country eﬀects present in the MR terms in (15) and GDP through
equation (13) is reported in Section 7.
−− Table 4 −−
22We also compared the models based on goodness-of-ﬁt (not reported). The estimated mean square
error (MSE) of the two-part model with   η-terms is about 15% lower than the other two-part model’s. In
turn, this two-part model has a MSE which is substantially lower than that of a conventional log-linear
Heckit or parametric Helpman, Melitz, Rubinstein (2008) estimator.
25With an estimated coeﬃcient of ˆ δ = 0.55, the partial eﬀect in the single index model
from Table 2 is 75% (= exp(ˆ δ) − 1), which is reasonably close to the total partial eﬀect
at the average in the two-part model, 68% (= [Φ(Q′
ijˆ ω + ˆ κ)/Φ( ¯ Qij
′ˆ ω)]exp(ˆ δ) − 1, where
sample averages are used for the variables in Qij), so that we may say that they indeed
measure the same quantity. The two-part model allows us to decompose this total eﬀect
into the contributions from the extensive and intensive margin:
E(X|PTA = 1,Z) − E(X|PTA = 0,Z)
E(X|PTA = 0,Z)
=




+ [exp(δ) − 1]
Φ(Q′ω + κ) + Φ(Q′ω)
Φ(Q′ω)
where the ﬁrst term is the partial eﬀect at the extensive margin and the second term the
one at the intensive margin. Evaluated at the average of the explanatory variables, these
are estimated to be 20%-points and 48%-points, respectively, in our sample. I.e., around
70% of the partial eﬀect is found to be attributable to the intensive country margin.
Let us contrast this ﬁnding with the results obtained when letting PTA be poten-
tially endogenous. We use the same variables here as before – COLONY, COMCOL and
SMCTRY– as identifying instruments for PTA in the two equations for Iij (column 6)
and positive exports (columns 7 and 8). As the distributional assumption identiﬁes the
bivariate probit model, we can test the three overidentifying restrictions (OIR) with an
F-test. The null hypothesis that the restrictions hold cannot be rejected in neither part
of the model (row “p-value of F” in columns 6, 7 and 8). The instruments also pass the
OIR test in log-linearized instrumental variable models (row “p-value of OIR” in columns
6, 7 and 8)23.
Let us now discuss the results about the error correlations and the coeﬃcient of PTA.
The estimate of ϑ is negative and signiﬁcant, which is in line with our ﬁndings in Table
2. Hence, as before, selection into PTAs on unobservables is negative. A signiﬁcant ˆ ρvξ
likewise suggests that there is endogeneity in the selection into exports decision. Here,
we ﬁnd evidence of positive self-selection based on unobservables, which is reﬂected in
23The test has two degrees of freedom here as one instrument is needed for identiﬁcation.
26the overestimation of the impact of PTA on the decision to export at all when neglecting
endogeneity of PTA. As a matter of fact, the results in Table 3 suggest that after control-
ling for endogeneity, PTA membership has an impact on the intensive margin, but does
not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the extensive margin of trade, i.e., the country intensive margin
accounts for the whole partial eﬀect of PTA (see also the corresponding estimated partial
eﬀects in Table 4).
Such a result could, for instance, be explained by suﬃciently high market-speciﬁc ﬁxed
entry costs which are unaﬀected by PTA formation, whereas marginal delivery costs are
lowered by PTA membership. Note that these results are compatible with empirical re-
search at a disaggregate level which emphasizes PTA to be important in shaping some
extensive margins of trade. Kehoe and Ruhl (2009), for instance, found NAFTA to af-
fect the extensive margin at the level (i.e., the number) of products traded. Extensive
and intensive product margins are partly subsumed by, but not identical to, the coun-
try intensive margin.24 Finally, the fact that the estimated correlations are of diﬀerent
signs is perfectly compatible with the general speciﬁcation of the model. The diﬀerently
signed correlations suggest that, after controlling for economic and political determinants,
extensive and intensive margins of export appear to be driven by heterogeneous factors.
The remaining variables are only marginally aﬀected by the change from the model
for exogenous PTA to the one where it is endogenous, with the sole exception here being
again BORD, which looses its signiﬁcant negative impact on the extensive margin.
7 Quantiﬁcation and discussion
We will illustrate the importance of considering both self-selection into PTAs and zero
export ﬂows by means of counterfactual analysis. In particular, we will compute the
impact of PTA membership as observed in the year 2005 to a situation without any PTA
24A change at the extensive product margin as in Feenstra and Kee (2008) or Kehoe and Ruhl (2009)
would be equivalent to a change at the extensive country margin only for the ﬁrst product(s) traded
bilaterally. Otherwise, an expansion at the extensive product margin for any pair of countries is measured
by an increase in the intensive country margin of exports in an aggregate analysis as ours.
27membership in the same year, using a variety of diﬀerent estimators and taking into
account general equilibrium eﬀects addressed in Sections 2 and 6.1.
The literature on the impact of endogenous PTA formation on trade suggests a positive
parameter estimate on nominal bilateral exports. For instance, Baier and Bergstrand
(2009) report estimates of average treatment eﬀects of in between 0.68 (using the matching
estimator of Abadie and Imbens (2006), for the year 2000; implying an eﬀect of about
97%) and 2.36 (using the same approach for the year 1990). While these estimates lie
in a similar range as the ones reported in previous work and take non-linear eﬀects of
trade costs as possible determinants of PTA formation into account, they do not consider
non-linear general equilibrium eﬀects of PTAs on exports. Baier and Bergstrand (2007)
acknowledge general equilibrium eﬀects with panel data but assume that PTA membership
is exogenous. However, the average treatment eﬀects from their preferred models are still
very close to the cross-sectional endogenous treatment eﬀects in their more recent paper,
amounting to 0.62 (implying an eﬀect of about 86%) and 0.54 (implying an eﬀect of about
72%). Relative to Baier and Bergstrand’s, Magee’s (2003) estimated PTA-eﬀects on trade
seem rather large: they lie between 300 percent and 800 percent. However, these estimates
do not account for ﬁxed country eﬀects in both trade volume and PTA equation.
Unlike previous work, our quantiﬁcation of PTA eﬀects on trade ﬂows respects general
equilibrium eﬀects, accounts for the diﬀerential impact of PTAs on the extensive and
intensive margins of exports, and treats PTAs endogenously. Finally, we will also infer
the importance of something that did not surface in the debate about PTA eﬀects on
trade yet: that most-favored nation tariﬀs are heterogeneous so that PTA membership
does not bring about identical tariﬀ reductions across country-pairs (see Anderson and
van Wincoop, 2002, for a treatment of tariﬀ eﬀects in their general equilibrium model).
Starting point of the quantiﬁcation are the parameter estimates summarized in Tables
2 and 3. Note that so far we did not need to rely on any speciﬁc underlying model. Our
estimation equations leading to the econometric speciﬁcation for the parameter estima-
tion are perfectly consistent with a wide range of recent international trade models.25
25This is due to the fact that the diﬀerences between models pertain to country-speciﬁc variables, which
28Speciﬁcally, it captures new trade theory models with love-of-variety preferences and ho-
mogeneous ﬁrms ` a la Krugman (1980), the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) exchange
economy, the Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) model allowing for ﬁrm hetero-
geneity and zero trade ﬂows, the Eaton and Kortum (2002) Ricardian model, and the
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model with quasi-linear quadratic preferences and endoge-
nous mark-ups. However, if one wants to go further and run a counterfactual analysis, it
is necessary to adopt one speciﬁc model and use the implied structural model equations.
In the subsequent analysis, we apply the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) framework.
Hence, in addition to the parameter estimates, we use the assumption that countries are
endowment economies and exports are related to exporter and importer GDP as well as
multilateral resistance terms as in equation (1).
For a quantiﬁcation of the general equilibrium-consistent average treatment eﬀect of
observed PTA membership on exports, we need to determine counterfactual bilateral
exports in the absence of PTA membership. For this, we set the binary PTA indicator to
zero and solve the system of 2N equations of exporter and importer MR terms in (15).26
This can be done by assuming that PTA membership is associated with heterogeneous
tariﬀ reductions or not.27 Irrespective of whether heterogeneous tariﬀs are acknowledged
or not, PTA formation has an impact on GDP and the latter has to be considered in
the solution of (15) and in the outcome equation for the intensive margin of exports, i.e.,
in (14). Tables 5a and 5b summarize the predicted eﬀects of PTA formation on trade
are captured by country-ﬁxed eﬀects in our estimation equations.
26Since σ, the elasticity of substitution between products, is not known, its level has to be estimated
or to be assumed. In the model of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), it can not be estimated since
the model does not impose enough structure. So, we follow them in setting σ = 5. Note that they ﬁnd
trade predictions to be fairly insensitive to the choice of diﬀerent values of σ. (If one used a model which
speciﬁed the supply side explicitly – such as a multi-country version of Krugman’s (1980) model – one
would be able to estimate σ.)
27To account for heterogeneous tariﬀs, we use data on tariﬀ revenues in total trade ﬂows from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2007, assume that tariﬀ rates are identical vis-` a-vis all PTA
nonmembers, and apply these tariﬀs to trade ﬂows of all trading partners of a country in the counterfactual
abolishment of preferential trade liberalization. In principal, one could replace PTAij by an appropriately
deﬁned (endogenous) tariﬀ variable and apply the framework suggested here. However, tariﬀs may be
inaccurately measured and PTA membership may entail more than just a bilateral reduction in tariﬀs.
Therefore, we prefer approximating tariﬀ eﬀects as indicated but employ the binary indicator variable in
the regressions.
29among PTA members relative to non-members for the models estimated in Tables 2 and
3, respectively.28 For each model, we distinguish between eﬀects that assume that PTAs
alter homogeneous tariﬀs (in Table 5a) preferentially versus ones that alter heterogeneous
tariﬀs (in Table 5b).
−− Tables 5a and 5b −−
In a nutshell, the ﬁgures in the tables suggest the following conclusions. First, trade
among PTA members increases due to preferential tariﬀ abolition. For instance, the model
which assumes exogenous PTA formation, no speciﬁc process for the extensive margin to
export, and no heterogeneous tariﬀ eﬀect on trade and GDP points to an increase in
nominal exports among PTA members relative to nonmembers by about 59% relative
to an equilibrium without any PTAs. This is reﬂected in the number which is given in
the outer left column of the top row of Table 5a labeled “Average percentage increase of
trade ﬂows of members in excess of non-members.” The estimated eﬀect is about 102
percentage points higher with endogenous PTA formation (about 161% higher exports
among PTA members relative to nonmembers than without PTAs; see the results in the
column labeled (3)-(4) at the top of Table 5a). Ignoring the heterogeneity of tariﬀs brings
about a negligible bias in our application.29 To see the latter, compare the results at the
top of Table 5a with the corresponding ones in Table 5b.
Modeling the process of endogenous selection into positive exports separate from the
non-linear process of positive exports is relatively important. It raises the predicted eﬀect
of PTA formation with endogenous PTAs on insiders’ trade relative to other country-
pairs – in the column labeled (5)-(7) of Table 5a the estimated comparative static eﬀect
of PTA membership amounts to 219% which exceeds the one-part model-based result of
161% by about 58 percentage points. In the two-part model which allows for correlated
28According to Walras’ law, absolute trade eﬀects are impossible to gauge in general but they have to
be expressed relative to one country-pair or relative to a group of pairs.
29In all models, the predicted eﬀect of PTA membership on members’ versus nonmembers’ bilateral
trade is slightly lower when considering heterogeneity of most-favored nation tariﬀs. The relatively small
bias from ignoring tariﬀ heterogeneity has to do with the fact that, on average, most-favored nation
tariﬀs are relatively homogeneous across countries in 2005 so that capturing tariﬀ eﬀects by a binary
PTA indicator variable does not conceal much information.
30disturbances between the extensive and intensive country margin equations at the outer
right of Table 5a, the corresponding estimated comparative static eﬀect is about 235%.
Of the latter eﬀect on exports, the lion’s share is contributed by the intensive margin.30
Overall, the estimated (long-run) eﬀects of PTA membership on bilateral trade are quite
large.
Moreover, Tables 5a and 5b indicate that a focus on PTA eﬀects on average trade ﬂows
– as had been done in most of the previous work on endogenous PTA eﬀects on trade
ﬂows – conceals the sizable variation eﬀects across country pairs.31 To see this, consider
the two blocs of results in the lower parts of Tables 5a and 5b. There, we report four
moments of the distribution of the percentage changes of bilateral exports both of PTA
members (at the center of each table) as well as of non-members (at the very bottom of
each table): the mean, the standard deviation, the minimum, and the maximum eﬀect for
each model.32 Obviously, most of the models display a standard deviation of eﬀects within
the groups of PTA members and non-members, which exceeds the average eﬀect. The
variation in the eﬀects is entirely due to the relevance of heterogeneity across countries in
general equilibrium. Hence, the underlying theoretical model suggests that the treatment
eﬀect of PTA membership is inherently heterogeneous. The results even point to negative
30Of 9,891 country-pairs with predicted positive bilateral exports in the cum-PTA benchmark equi-
librium, 69 are predicted to stop exporting if all PTAs were abandoned when using the exogenous-PTA
probit model in column (2) of Table 3. With the endogenous-PTA model in column (6) of Table 3, 106
are predicted to stop exporting in counterfactual general equilibrium relative to the benchmark equilib-
rium. This result is based on estimates which disregard the fact that (most-favored nation) tariﬀs are
heterogeneous across countries so that preferential trade liberalization is associated with tariﬀ reductions
of diﬀerent magnitude across country-pairs. In order to disentangle PTA-induced eﬀects on exports that
arise through changes at the extensive and intensive margins of trade we proceeded as follows. First, we
calculated the total eﬀect on trade by using estimates of the two-part model with endogenous PTAs –
including eﬀects on the extensive and intensive margins. Then, we calculated an alternative counterfac-
tual by holding the margin constant at the benchmark equilibrium. The latter, leads to results that are
very similar to the ones for the one-part models, where endogenous selection into positive exports is not
accounted for.
31That treatment eﬀects tend to be heterogeneous across the treated is widely acknowledged in other
ﬁelds of economics (see Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes, 2005, for an example in public economics). However,
empirical international economists tend to focus on average eﬀects of treatments such as PTA membership
and other treatments on outcome of interest and tend to ignore that theoretical models often would suggest
heterogeneous treatment eﬀects.
32Notice that, for all two-part models, we provide these ﬁgures only for the sub-sample of country-pairs
with positive exports.
31eﬀects from the simultaneous implementation of PTAs in the world economy on some PTA
members (accruing to third country eﬀects of foreign PTAs). Similarly, there are even
PTA non-members which gain from the simultaneous implementation of foreign PTAs.
PTA members face positive and PTA non-members negative eﬀects of PTA formation on
trade ﬂows only on average.
Altogether, these ﬁndings suggest that the empirical models proposed here may help
to estimate eﬀects of endogenous PTA eﬀects on trade ﬂows which have appeal from both
a theoretical and an empirical perspective. First, proposed models principally allow for
a disproportionate number of zero trade ﬂows and endogenous PTA membership which
previously proposed estimators for gravity models did not allow for (and accommodated
only one or the other). Second, the proposed models allow for estimation of eﬀects which
fully account for general equilibrium eﬀects of PTA membership associated with GDP
responses to membership and ultimately heterogeneous treatment eﬀects of PTA forma-
tion. For instance, recently proposed micro-econometric methods (such as propensity
score matching or switching regression) did not share this feature.
8 Concluding remarks
This paper proposes non-linear econometric techniques for the analysis of trade policy
eﬀects on bilateral trade ﬂows which subsume three features: they pay speciﬁc attention
to zeros in bilateral trade matrices; they allow trade policy variables – such as binary
preferential trade agreement (PTA) indicators but eventually also continuous trade policy
measures – to be endogenous; and they account for non-linear eﬀects of trade policy and
trade costs in stylized general equilibrium models. All of these features have been judged
as being important in recent empirical work in international economics, but no attempt
has been made to address them in a uniﬁed framework as we do.
Apart from addressing the issue from an econometric perspective and from summa-
rizing methodical frameworks for empirical work on the matter, we apply the suggested
procedures to estimate general equilibrium-consistent eﬀects of PTA membership on bilat-
32eral trade ﬂows in a cross-sectional data-set for the year 2005. For this, we have to assume
a speciﬁc general equilibrium structure, and we rely on the one proposed by Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003) for convenience.
The obtained results suggest that ignoring endogenous selection into PTAs is relatively
harmful. The impact of endogenous PTAs on members’ relative to nonmembers’ trade
ﬂows is about 188 percentage points higher than in a model which assumes PTA mem-
bership to be exogenous. With the data-set at hand, the process of zero versus positive
exports should be modeled separately from the one of positive exports. Ignoring the latter
leads to a downward bias of the predicted trade eﬀects of PTAs by about 73 percentage
points as compared to the preferred model.
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Appendix
A Country coverage (126 economies)
The following set of countries is covered in our data-set:
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan,, Bangladesh,
Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana,
Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros,
Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Islamic Rep. Iran,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Rep. Korea, Kuwait,
Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Mada-
gascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique,
Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman,
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Van-
uatu, RB Venezuela, Zimbabwe.
B PTA coverage (121 agreements)
Our data-set includes all PTAs notiﬁed to the World Trade Organization that are active
since 2005 or earlier. The data are augmented and corrected by using information from
38PTA secretariat web-pages. This leads to a coverage of the following PTAs in our data-set:
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania
and Bulgaria, Albania and FYR Macedonia, Albania and Moldova, Albania and Roma-
nia, Armenia and Kazakhstan, Armenia and Moldova, Armenia and Russian Federation,
Armenia and Turkmenistan, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Baltic
Free Trade Area (BAFTA), Bangkok Agreement, Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina, Bulgaria and FYR Macedonia, Bulgaria and Israel, Bulgaria and Turkey, Central
American Common Market (CACM), Andean Subregional Integration Agreement (Carta-
gena Agreement, CAN), Canada and Chile, Canada and Israel, Canada and Costa Rica,
Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA),
Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (CER), Chile and
Costa Rica, Chile and El Salvador, Chile and Mexico, Commonwealth of Independent
States Free Trade Agreement (CIS), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA), Croatia and Albania, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and
FYR Macedonia, East African Community Treaty (EAC), Eurasian Economic Commu-
nity (EAEC), European Community (EC), EC and Algeria, EC and Bulgaria, EC and
Chile, EC and Croatia, EC and Egypt, EC and FYR Macedonia, EC and Iceland, EC
and Israel, EC and Jordan, EC and Lebanon, EC and Mexico, EC and Morocco, EC and
Norway, Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), EC and Romania, EC and South
Africa, EC and Switzerland and Liechtenstein, EC and Syria, EC and Tunesia, EC and
Turkey, Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA), European Free Trade As-
sociation (EFTA), EFTA and Bulgaria, EFTA and Chile, EFTA and Croatia, EFTA
and FYR Macedonia, EFTA and Israel, EFTA and Jordan, EFTA and Mexico, EFTA
and Morocco, EFTA and Romania, EFTA and Singapor, EFTA and Tunisia, EFTA and
Turkey, FYR Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Uniﬁed Economic Agreement
between the Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Georgia and Armenia,
Georgia and Kazakhstan, Georgia and Russian Federation, Georgia and Turkmenistan,
Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries (GSTP), India and
Sri Lanka, Israel and Turkey, Japan and Mexico, Japan and Singapor, Kyrgyz Republic
39and Armenia, Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova, Kyrgyz
Republic and Russian Federation, Asociaci´ on Latinoamericana de Integraci´ on (ALADI,
LAIA), Mercado Com´ un del Sur (MERCOSUR), Mexico and Israel, Moldova and Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Moldova and Bulgaria, Moldova and Croatia, Moldova and FYR Mace-
donia, Melanesian Spearhead Group Free Trade Area Agreement (MSG), North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), New Zealand and Singapore, Panama and El Salvador,
Papua New Guinea - Australia Trade and Commercial Relations Agreement (PATCRA),
Protocol relating to Trade Negotiations among Developing Countries (PTN), Rep. of
Korea and Chile, Romania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania and FYR Macedo-
nia, Romania and Israel, Romania and Moldova, Romania and Turkey, Southern African
Development Community (SADC), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA), Singapore and Australia, South Paciﬁc Re-
gional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA), Thailand and Aus-
tralia, TRIPARTITE, Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey and Croatia, Turkey
and FYR Macedonia, United States and Chile, United States and Isreal, United States
and Jordan, United States and Singapore, Unites States and Australia, Traite Modiﬁ´ e de
l’Union ´ Economique et Mon´ etaire Ouest Africaine (WAEMU/UEMOA).
40Tables
41Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the data
Variable Description Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Xij nominal exports in million U.S. dollars 305.9274 3257.2670 0 213763.06
Iij indicator variable taking value one if Xij > 0 0.6280 0.4834 0 1
PTAij indicator variable taking value one if two countries belong to a
common PTA since 2005 or earlier 0.2226 0.4160 0 1
DISTij log distance 8.2002 0.8267 3.2467 9.4191
BORDij common border indicator variable 0.0210 0.1432 0 1
LANGij common language/ethnicity indicator variable 0.1393 0.3463 0 1
COLONYij colony indicator variable 0.0152 0.1225 0 1
COMCOLij common colonizer indicator variable 0.0777 0.2677 0 1
CURCOLij colony after 1945 indicator variable 0.0084 0.0912 0 1
SMCTRYij same country indicator variable 0.0088 0.0935 0 1
CONTij same continent indicator variable 0.2303 0.4211 0 1
DURABij durability of an exporter’s and an importer’s political regime 29.4047 29.2178 0 100
POLCOMPij political competition index 8.8961 19.9440 0 98
AUTOCij autocracy index 7.9867 18.9474 0 98
Number of observations 15750
4
2Table 2: Estimation results for gravity models for trade
Exogenous PTA Endogenous PTA
Regression E(ln(Xij)) E(Xij| ) Pr(PTAij = 1| ) E(Xij| )
Estimator OLS Poisson PML Probit ML Poisson PML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PTA 0.3943 0.5548 — 1.1471
(0.0499) (0.1256) (0.3838)
DIST -1.2342 -0.4998 -1.0737 -0.3971
(0.0417) (0.0492) (0.0403) (0.0675)
BORD 0.7264 0.7263 -0.4687 0.7405
(0.1115) (0.0726) (0.1292) (0.0748)
LANG 0.6490 0.1553 -0.1193 0.2079
(0.0555) (0.0813) (0.0626) (0.0698)
CONT -0.0143 0.2736 0.7650 0.1506
(0.0549) (0.1222) (0.0479) (0.1579)
DURAB -0.0026 -0.0038 -0.0072 -0.0041
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009)
POLCOMP 0.0106 0.0737 -0.0483 0.1044
(0.0010) (0.0327) (0.0091) (0.0271)
AUTOC -0.3784 -0.1039 0.0480 -0.1391
(0.0122) (0.0325) (0.0098) (0.0291)
CURCOL 1.3321 0.7246 0.5189 0.6179
(0.1402) (0.1695) (0.2468) (0.1833)
COLONY — — 0.1356 —
(0.1941)
COMCOL — — 0.5519 —
(0.0719)
SMCTRY — — 1.2275 —
(0.2496)
ˆ ϑ — — — -0.3708
(0.1810)
F-stat. — — 88.7790 2.4949
p-value of F — — 0.0000 0.4762
F-stat. OIR — — — 1.4530
p-value of OIR — — — 0.4836
Observations 9891 15750 15750 15750
Countries 126 126 126 126
Notes:
The sources of the data are the United Nations’ World Trade Database and the Centre d’Etudes
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales.
All regressions include importer and exporter ﬁxed eﬀects. The last two columns indicate results
where PTA was instrumented. ˆ ϑ is a measure for potential endogeneity of PTAij. “F-stat.”
and “p-value of F” refer to a test of joint signiﬁcance of COLONY, COMCOL and SMCTRY in
the respective equation. The F-statistic should be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in column (4)
but not in column (5). ”F-stat. OIR” and ”p-value of OIR” refer to a test for over-identifying
restrictions in the corresponding log-linear IV model.Table 3: Estimation results for two-part gravity models for trade
Exogenous PTA Endogenous PTA
Regression Pr(X > 0)E(X|X > 0) E(X|X > 0) Pr(PTA = 1) Pr(X > 0) E(X|X > 0) E(X|X > 0)
Estimator Probit Poisson Poisson Biv.Probit Biv.Probit Poisson Poisson
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PTA 0.3515 0.3698 0.3642 — -0.0307 1.2118 1.2701
(0.0559) (0.0711) (0.0706) (0.1326) (0.3715) (0.3961)
DIST -1.1454 -0.6209 -0.6049 -1.0689 -0.9448 -0.3873 -0.4958
(0.0466) (0.0344) (0.0395) (0.0388) (0.0434) (0.0670) (0.1135)
BORD -0.4276 0.6478 0.6948 -0.4469 -0.0647 0.7566 0.8124
(0.1848) (0.0596) (0.0603) (0.1184) (0.1673) (0.0759) (0.0812)
LANG 0.6341 0.2108 0.1907 -0.0974 0.6258 0.2241 0.2368
(0.0628) (0.0627) (0.0613) (0.0616) (0.0616) 0.0655) 0.0922)
CONT 0.1041 0.2897 0.2926 0.7794 0.3095 0.0930 -0.0797
(0.0596) (0.0656) (0.0642) (0.0479) (0.0581) (0.1568) (0.1531)
DURAB -0.0070 -0.0028 -0.0026 -0.0071 -0.0018 -0.0043 -0.0040
(0.0016) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0009)
POLCOMP -0.0027 0.0804 0.0918 -0.0483 0.0042 0.0947 0.0920
(0.0087) (0.0198) (0.0201) (0.0089) (0.0086) (0.0262) (0.0269)
AUTOC 0.0011 -0.0594 -0.0681 0.0479 -0.0069 -0.1296 -0.1283
(0.0093) (0.0301) (0.0298) (0.0097) (0.0092) (0.0305) (0.0317)
CURCOL -0.1339 0.3802 0.3685 0.5218 -0.1638 0.5391 0.4842
(0.3752) (0.1872) (0.1807) (0.2377) (0.3396) (0.1784) (0.1788)
(  ηij)2 — — -0.0377 — — — -0.1129
(0.0044) (0.0483)
(  ηij)3 — — 0.0094 — — — 0.0359
(0.0012) (0.0365)
(  ηij)4 — — -0.0006 — — — -0.0053
(0.0001) (0.0063)
COLONY — — — 0.1318 — — —
(0.1899)
COMCOL — — — 0.4505 — — —
(0.0757)
SMCTRY — — — 1.2244 — — —
(0.2210)
ˆ ρvξ — — — — 0.2895 — —
(0.0834)
ˆ ϑ — — — — — -0.4016 -0.4373
(0.1710) (0.1770)
F-stat. — — 48.4092 3.7782 1.6329 5.5857
p-value of F — — 0.0000 0.2864 0.6519 0.1336
F-stat. OIR — — — 2.6605 1.4530 3.0029
p-value of OIR — — — 0.1029 0.4836 0.2228
Obs. 13500 9891 9891 15750 15750 9891 9891
Countries 126 126 126 126 126 126 126
Notes:
All regressions include importer and exporter ﬁxed eﬀects. In the second column, the number of observations is reduced due to countries
that export to the whole “world” and which are dropped from the estimation. These are Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, China, Germany,
Denmark, Finland, France, GB, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and USA.
The sources of the data are the United Nations’ World Trade Database and the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Inter-
nationales. ”F-stat.” and ”p-value of F” refer to a test of joint signiﬁcance of COLONY, COMCOL and SMCTRY in the respective
equation. The F-statistic should be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in column (5) but not in (6)-(8). ”F-stat. OIR” and ”p-value of
OIR” refer to a test for over-identifying restrictions in the corresponding log-linear IV model.Table 4: Partial (i.e., non-general-equilibrium) eﬀects of PTA
Model Total Decomposition
Ext. Marg. Int. Marg.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exogenous PTA
Single index 74.15% — —
Table 2, col. (2)
Two-part 67.92% 19.59% 48.33%
Table 3, col. (2),(3)
Two-part with   ηij-terms 66.98% 19.52% 47.45%
Table 3, col. (2),(4)
Endogenous PTA
Single index 214.90% — —
Table 2, col. (3),(4)
Two-part 235.02% -0.60% 235.62%
Table 3, col. (5),(6)
Two-part with   ηij-terms 255.12% -.63% 255.75%
Table 3, col. (5),(7)
Notes:
Ext. Marg. and Int. Marg. are the partial eﬀects of PTA membership on the extensive
and intensive margins of exports, respectively. Partial eﬀects for two-part models are
evaluated at the average of explanatory variables.Table 5a: Counterfactual results with homogeneous tariﬀ rates
One-part models (Table 2) Two-part modelsb (Table 3)
Exogenous PTA Endogenous PTA Exogenous PTA Endogenous PTA
Based on columns in respective table (2) (3)-(4) (2)-(3) (2),(4) (5)-(7) (5),(6),(8)
Average percentage increase of trade ﬂows
of PTA members relative to non-members 58.97 161.36 41.80 45.75 219.36 234.57
∆Xij among PTA members in %:a
mean 39.3965 101.6426 14.2631 12.6884 59.4102 61.8560
std. dev. 29.5054 94.7278 15.1128 14.5677 68.1883 73.9056
min -10.9748 -22.2771 -25.9965 -25.1213 -63.4330 -64.9363
max 141.6656 514.3927 62.0881 61.9867 381.9351 431.8087
# of PTA member pairs with
positive eﬀect 3456 3450 2749 2719 2701 2674
negative eﬀect 50 56 229 259 277 304
∆Xij among PTA non-members in %:a
mean -4.8554 -9.0345 -6.6081 -6.7792 -18.8946 -19.5906
std. dev. 16.1757 32.7673 8.8012 9.0138 22.7672 23.7805
min -41.8862 -67.5594 -45.9182 -45.3577 -87.3477 -88.5390
max 38.6748 95.6077 10.4128 13.0945 27.7728 32.5374
# of PTA non-member pairs with
positive eﬀect 4108 3916 691 683 473 498
negative eﬀect 8136 8328 6222 6230 6440 6415
Notes:
a ∆Xij: base scenario trade ﬂows minus counterfactual trade ﬂows relative to counterfactual trade ﬂows in %; std. dev.: standard deviation.
b In the two-part models, ∆Xij was calculated in the sub-sample of pairs with positive trade ﬂows Xij in both the benchmark and the
counterfactual equilibrium.
There are 3,632 PTA member pairs, whereof in 654 ∆Xij = 0 occurred. Of the 12,244 PTA non-member pairs, in 5,331 cases the model
predicted ∆Xij = 0.Table 5b: Counterfactual results with heterogeneous tariﬀ rates
One-part models (Table 2) Two-part modelsb (Table 3)
Exogenous PTA Endogenous PTA Exogenous PTA Endogenous PTA
Based on columns in respective table (2) (3)-(4) (2)-(3) (2),(4) (5)-(7) (5),(6),(8)
Average percentage increase of trade ﬂows
of PTA members relative to non-members 58.61 160.88 41.68 45.69 219.13 234.48
∆Xij among PTA members in %:a
mean 40.7396 103.1379 13.7920 12.5047 58.7820 61.3718
std. dev. 30.5686 96.0032 15.1707 14.8975 67.8647 73.5924
min -10.0238 -21.7366 -27.4492 -26.8490 -64.0591 -65.5265
max 142.8524 516.1415 61.1247 62.5190 376.4445 425.3974
# of PTA member pairs with
positive eﬀect 3458 3448 2736 2695 2700 2674
negative eﬀect 48 58 242 283 278 304
∆Xij among PTA non-members in %:a
mean -3.7172 -8.2642 -6.8230 -6.7841 -19.0597 -19.7246
std. dev. 16.5521 33.0922 8.9757 9.1057 22.8397 23.8268
min -42.0441 -67.6475 -46.4574 -45.8900 -87.4854 -88.6601
max 39.7881 96.4289 10.1447 12.6403 26.9016 32.1130
# of PTA non-member pairs with
positive eﬀect 4484 4008 658 723 458 483
negative eﬀect 7760 8236 6255 6190 6455 6430
Notes:
a ∆Xij: base scenario trade ﬂows minus counterfactual trade ﬂows relative to counterfactual trade ﬂows in %; std. dev.: standard deviation.
b In the two-part models, ∆Xij was calculated in the sub-sample of pairs with positive trade ﬂows Xij in both the benchmark and the
counterfactual equilibrium.
There are 3,632 PTA member pairs, whereof in 654 ∆Xij = 0 occurred. Of the 12,244 PTA non-member pairs, in 5,331 cases the model
predicted ∆Xij = 0.